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Mexico’s Retrogression: Implications of a Bankruptcy 
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Arturo C. Porzecanski 
 
An earlier essay (“Corporate Workouts in 
Mexico: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”) told 
of how Mexico had made considerable 
progress in the past decade-and-a-half in 
matters pertaining to corporate law, the 
strengthening of property rights, and the ease 
of doing business.1 It highlighted in particular 
the benefits of a new law governing the 
Mexican insolvency regime—the Ley de 
Concursos Mercantiles (LCM, best translated as 
the “Business Reorganization Act” of 2000, as 
amended in 2007). 
 
It pointed out that the Mexican insolvency 
regime was being put to the test by the 
creditor-unfriendly precedent that Vitro S.A.B. 
was trying to set. Vitro, one of the world’s 
largest producers and distributors of glass 
products, is one of several major Mexican 
corporations that found themselves at the 
losing end of various currency derivative 
contracts in late 2008, when in the aftermath 
of the Lehman Brothers debacle, the Mexican 
peso unexpectedly took a big hit while the U.S. 
dollar rallied. 
 
This essay provides additional background on 
the Vitro case; updates the troubling 
developments in that restructuring proceeding 
so far this year; and discusses the implications  
                                                 
1
 See my “Corporate Workouts in Mexico: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly,” CSIS Issues in International 
Political Economy, April 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of this landmark precedent—not least of which 
is the impression it is creating, namely, that 
Mexico is retrogressing, becoming an 
unpredictable and risky jurisdiction for the 
adjudication of legitimate claims involving 
domestic and foreign creditors. 
 
Background 
 
Vitro S.A.B., one of Mexico’s leading 
multinational companies, is a holding that 
conducts substantially all of its international 
operations through subsidiaries, including 
more than a dozen in the United States, and 
has manufacturing facilities and distribution 
centers in many countries throughout the 
Main Points: 
 The corporate restructuring of a major Mexican 
multinational (Vitro), now winding its way 
through the Mexican courts, is raising serious 
doubts about the capacity of the country’s 
insolvency regime to deliver an outcome 
viewed as fair and consistent with prevailing 
norms and practices in the United States and 
other reputable jurisdictions. 
 
 The case has the potential to complicate U.S.-
Mexico diplomatic relations and to have a 
chilling effect on the easy access to foreign 
financing that Mexican corporations have 
enjoyed during recent years. Cemex, Mexico’s 
flagship multinational corporation, may be 
particularly vulnerable to adverse fallout from 
the Vitro case. 
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Americas and Europe. It has annual net sales 
approaching $2 billion, maintains a workforce 
of about 17,000 mostly concentrated in 
Mexico, and exports its products to more than 
50 countries. 
 
In early 2009, Vitro failed to pay $293 million 
in derivative contracts as well as interest 
payments on bonds maturing in 2012, 2013, 
and 2017, triggering a default on 
approximately $1.5 billion in debt held by 
banks and unrelated bondholders around the 
world. Subsequently, Vitro filed for voluntary 
bankruptcy in mid-December of 2010 in the 
hope of gaining court approval for a 
restructuring plan that supposedly had the 
backing of a majority of its creditors.  
 
Yet to gain support for a restructuring plan 
that would spare shareholders and force 
creditors to take steep haircuts—a debt 
exchange worth less than 60 cents on the 
dollar—Vitro had taken the unusual step of 
creating, post-default, some $1.9 billion of 
intra-company loans from subsidiaries. This 
was an amount greater than their obligations 
to the company’s bona fide creditors. The 
company’s intention was to enable these 
subsidiary creditors—the ones that had lent 
money to the holding company—to cast votes 
in support of Vitro’s restructuring plan, 
thereby overwhelming any opposition from 
unrelated creditors. Moreover, its affiliates 
entered into a lockup agreement with the 
holding company that requires them to vote in 
favor of a restructuring that would release 
them from the payment guarantees they had 
extended to outside creditors. 
 
The issue of intra-company debt had 
previously been broached in the 2009 
restructuring of Corporación Durango S.A.B. de 
C.V. (now renamed Bio-Pappel), one of 
Mexico’s largest paper products 
manufacturers. Durango, like Vitro and several 
other large Mexican companies, had also 
encountered debt-servicing difficulties in 2008 
and had defaulted on more than $500 million 
of notes due in 2017. There were intra-
company liabilities between Durango and its 
subsidiaries, and the bankruptcy court 
recognized these claims.2 However, the 
company and its bondholders came to 
agreement on a reorganization plan that was 
finalized in August 2009, and thus Durango’s 
management did not have to force approval of 
its restructuring proposal by casting the votes 
of its subsidiaries. The new obligations that 
were created (senior guaranteed notes) 
subordinated all intra-company loans and 
placed restrictions on the creation of any new 
intra-company obligations.3 
 
The case of Vitro is thus the first time ever—
and not just since the Ley de Concursos 
Mercantiles was enacted 11 years ago—that 
the Mexican courts have been presented with 
such an odd situation: A debtor company 
attempting to defeat its genuine creditors by 
creating, after its default, massive intra-
company liabilities for the sole purpose of 
rigging the outcome of its own workout 
process. It is a maneuver that would be 
deemed illegal in the United States and other 
major jurisdictions, where any intra-company 
liabilities would be offset by their counterpart 
intra-company assets, such that subsidiaries 
play no role in the consolidated entity’s 
restructuring. 
 
Recent Developments 
 
As mentioned, Vitro filed for voluntary 
bankruptcy in mid-December 2010 (in 
Monterrey’s Federal District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial Circuit). At the time, its 
aggregate outstanding third-party 
                                                 
2
 Standard & Poor’s, “How Did Recovery Ratings on 
Mexican Corporate Issuers Perform through the 
Financial Crisis?” October 3, 2011, p. 5. 
3
 Fitch Ratings, Latin America High Yield, vol. II, 
November 2, 2010, pp. 32–33. 
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consolidated indebtedness was approximately 
$1.7 billion, $1.2 billion of which represented 
the outstanding principal amount owed on the 
aforementioned bonds maturing in 2012, 
2013, and 2017. Vitro’s aggregate outstanding 
indebtedness to its direct and indirect 
subsidiaries (the intra-company debt) was 
approximately $1.9 billion as of end-2010.4 
 
On January 7, 2011, Vitro’s bankruptcy filing 
was denied, because the Mexican court found 
that intra-company claims should not be 
considered. When Vitro appealed, the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit Appeals Court judge initially 
ruled in late January that the decision could 
not be appealed. This procedural decision was 
challenged by Vitro, and on April 8 the same 
judge reversed himself, accepting the 
company’s filing of a concurso mercantil 
voluntario con plan de reestructura previo—a 
bankruptcy reorganization plan that is filed 
voluntarily by a debtor. 
 
Vitro also filed a Chapter 15 petition in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
New York, applying for recognition of the 
Mexican filing as a “foreign main proceeding” 
under sections 1515 and 1517 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. The purpose was to ensure 
that the U.S. courts would defer to the 
Mexican courts, so that Vitro’s bankruptcy 
reorganization process would take place in 
only one—its home—jurisdiction. At the 
request of dissident bondholders, the venue 
for a decision on this petition was changed 
from New York to Dallas (part of the Northern 
District of Texas), where on July 21 a Chapter 
15 ruling was issued in favor of Vitro’s 
Mexico-based proceedings. 
 
Vitro’s concurso mercantil process in Mexico 
then advanced along the expected path. Back 
                                                 
4
 U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, 
“Memorandum of Opinion on Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction,” Vitro S.A.B. Plaintiff, June 24, 2011, p. 
4. 
in April, the court in Monterrey requested the 
Federal Institute of Bankruptcy Specialists 
(IFECOM) to appoint an insolvency 
professional called a conciliator (conciliador), 
for the purpose of reviewing the validity and 
ranking of all claims according to their 
seniority. He is Javier Navarro-Velasco, a 
seasoned bankruptcy attorney and a partner 
in the Monterrey office of Baker & McKenzie.  
 
Last August, a final list of creditors was issued 
by Conciliator Navarro and was submitted to 
the relevant court, whereupon a decision was 
issued granting recognition of rank, amount, 
and order of those creditors contained in the 
definitive list. The list recognized the 
contentious intra-company claims created by 
Vitro in the wake of its default. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latest Developments 
 
The restructuring process has taken an 
unexpected turn in the last few weeks, 
however. Navarro found that the company’s 
creditors were sharply divided as to Vitro’s 
December 2010 proposal. Those representing 
intra-company claims sided with Vitro’s 
management, while the genuine creditors who 
Vitro Res ructuring Time-Line 
 
Feb. 2009 Vitro defaults on its bonds. 
 
Mar. 2009 Vitro begins negotiations with its  
  bondholders. 
 
Dec. 2009 Vitro secretly engages in various 
  intra-company transactions; 
  its subsidiaries go from owing 
  the holding $1.2 billion to being 
  owed $1.5 billion. 
   
Oct. 2010 Vitro finally discloses these 
  intra-company transactions. 
 
Nov. 2010 Vitro requests debt forgiveness 
  from its bondholders via a debt 
  exchange, but it is rejected. 
 
Dec. 2010 Vitro files a reorganization plan.  
 
Jan. 2011 The judge rejects the plan 
  because of its dependence on 
  intra-company debt for approval. 
 
Apr. 2011 An Appellate Court reverses the 
  decision and accepts Vitro’s plan. 
  A conciliator is appointed. 
 
Aug. 2011 On advice of the conciliator, the 
  list of recognized debts receives 
  court approval; intra-company 
 debtors are included. 
 
Oct. 2011 The conciliator does not host 
  negotiations based on alternative 
  financial scenarios; ignores a 
  creditor counterproposal; and 
  submits a revised plan more 
punitive for Vitro’s creditors. 
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collectively own more than 60 percent of 
Vitro’s $1.2 billion of outstanding senior notes 
and the majority of the third-party claims were 
opposed. In fact, the latter group put forth a 
counterproposal to Navarro on October 19 
that sought a restructuring not as lopsidedly 
favorable to Vitro’s shareholders.5  
 
Faced with this split, the reasonable 
expectation was that Navarro would seek a 
negotiated solution most parties could 
embrace, though a consensus is not required 
for a reorganization agreement to be valid and 
binding. Mexican law (the LCM) basically 
requires that the agreement be approved by 
the debtor and creditors representing a 
majority (at least half) of the recognized 
unsecured debt. Mexican law also allows 
secured creditors who do not approve of the 
proposed settlement to continue with their 
enforcement proceedings, executing on 
whatever collateral has been pledged to them. 
 
The surprising turn of events was that, on 
October 31, Navarro handed to the relevant 
bankruptcy judge, Sandra Elizabeth López, a 
finalized version of Vitro’s restructuring plan 
that was less favorable to all creditors and was 
particularly harsh toward any dissenting, 
holdout creditors. This is hardly behavior 
consistent with the role of a “conciliator”—
someone who overcomes distrust or animosity 
and attempts to reconcile divergent interests. 
Rather than acting as an impartial, 
constructive party in this restructuring process, 
Conciliator Navarro appears to have sided with 
Vitro in coming up with an even more debtor-
biased financial plan. 
 
According to a press release issued by Vitro, 
the new plan is “substantially identical” to that 
filed by the company in December 2010; 
                                                 
5
 Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders, “Ad Hoc Group 
of Vitro Noteholders Submitted Proposal and Does Not 
Support the Plan of Reorganization Filed by the 
Conciliador,” Business Wire, November 4, 2011. 
includes “certain improved economic terms” 
on new mandatory convertible debentures 
(MCDs); offers an additional fee to consenting 
creditors; and incorporates disincentives to 
dissident creditors “designed to ensure that 
the restructuring contemplated by the 
Concurso Plan is consummated and 
implemented without delay or risk to Vitro or 
its creditors.”6 These disincentives include 
setting up a Creditor Litigation Trust into which 
interest payments due to nonconsenting 
creditors will be made and from which all 
litigation-related expenses will be deducted, as 
well as imposing time limits after which 
dissenting creditors forfeit the entirety of their 
investments. 
 
However, an impartial examination of 
Navarro’s amended restructuring plan 
suggests that the “carrots” introduced are not 
meaningful and that the “sticks” are quite 
punitive, such that all things considered, his 
proposal actually appears worse than the 
company’s previous offer. 
 
For example, according to recently published 
research by J.P. Morgan’s senior corporate 
debt analyst Jacob Steinfeld, fewer new bonds 
and MCDs are now on offer for creditors who 
participate, and the “sweeteners” mentioned 
do not deliver much additional value. Thus, for 
creditors planning to participate, “We value 
the company’s latest proposal lower than its 
past proposal.”7 Regarding the fate of 
nonconsenting creditors, they are now the 
object of a blatantly discriminatory deal 
structure meant to pressure them into 
surrendering or face losses much more 
significant than those that consenting creditors 
will bear. Lamentably for its creditors, “the 
                                                 
6
 Vitro Press Release, “Vitro Announces Filing by 
Conciliador of Concurso Plan in Mexican Court,” 
October 31, 2011. 
7
 Jacob Steinfeld, “Vitro S.A.: New Plan Structure 
Aimed to Pressure Non-Consenting Creditors,” J.P. 
Morgan, November 1, 2011, p. 2. 
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company can support a much higher debt 
balance than what is being proposed and could 
offer a proposal that is worth significantly 
more.”8 
 
Short-Term Implications 
 
Since the conciliator succeeded in sowing 
more discord among creditors than existed 
before he got involved in the case, the 
immediate consequence of the ongoing legal 
proceedings in Monterrey will be more 
litigation—in Mexico, the United States, and 
perhaps elsewhere. 
 
The conciliator does not appear to have acted 
in a neutral or constructive manner. 
Reportedly, he did not obtain or make 
available the kind of financial information 
necessary for any meaningful exploration of 
alternative financial scenarios and thus for a 
determination of Vitro’s ability to pay.9 He 
allegedly did not engage in a negotiation 
process before or after receiving an alternate 
restructuring proposal.10 Therefore, Navarro’s 
actions will surely be challenged in accordance 
with Mexico’s legal provisions during the 
coming days and weeks. 
 
Beyond that, ongoing litigation in New York 
initiated by Wilmington Trust in its capacity as 
indenture trustee with respect to Vitro’s 2012 
and 2017 bonds in default—a combined $1 
billion outstanding—will also take added 
importance. These securities were guaranteed 
by numerous Vitro subsidiaries located in the 
United States and elsewhere. In their 
respective indentures, each of the Vitro-owned 
guarantors “expressly acknowledges that this 
Guaranty is governed by the laws of the State 
of New York and expressly agrees that any 
rights and privileges that such Guarantor might 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., p. 3. 
9
 Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders, “Ad Hoc Group 
of Vitro Noteholders Submitted Proposal.” 
10
 Ibid. 
otherwise have under the laws of Mexico shall 
not be applicable.”11 Vitro’s reorganization 
plan contemplates the stripping of these 
subsidiary guarantees such that the bonds may 
be restructured, but Wilmington argues that 
these guarantees cannot be affected by the 
holding’s insolvency proceeding in Mexico. A 
ruling in this case (on the part of the New York 
Supreme Court in New York City) should be 
forthcoming. 
 
Implications for Issuers and Investors 
 
At a time when Mexico is beset by other 
serious challenges in the sphere of law and 
order, it is a pity that the progress that lenders 
and investors thought the country had made—
in corporate governance, creditors’ rights, 
judicial impartiality, and the ease of doing 
business—is suffering a setback because of 
Vitro’s unsettling saga. 
 
At first glance, the trend in successful bond 
issuance on the part of Mexican companies 
rated below investment grade does not reveal 
any Vitro-related reduction in access to the 
international capital markets. Indeed, despite 
the debt-servicing difficulties experienced by 
several leading Mexican companies in 2008–
2009,12 new issuance in the U.S. dollar market 
has bounced back nicely since mid-2009—and 
2011 appears set for a banner year. Through 
end-October, and regardless of all the market 
turmoil courtesy of Southern Europe’s debt 
woes, Mexican corporations have managed to 
                                                 
11
 Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of 
New York, “Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,” 
Wilmington Trust N.A. Plaintiff, September 29, 2011, p. 
5. 
12
 Seven speculative-grade Mexican corporate issuers 
rated by Standard & Poor’s defaulted during the 2008–
2010 period. Five resolved them within two years and 
the weighted average recovery rate was 67 percent. The 
two as yet unresolved cases are Vitro and Industrias 
Unidas. See Standard & Poor’s, “How Did Recovery 
Ratings on Mexican Corporate Issuers Perform?” pp. 3–
4. 
6 
 
 
raise $4.4 billion, up sharply from $2.8 billion, 
in the first 10 months of 2010. 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
 
However, a look behind the overall numbers 
shows that a great deal of Mexico-related 
corporate default risk is riding on a single bet—
the continued financial viability of Cemex. 
Granted, it is by far the largest multinational 
corporation in Latin America, not just Mexico, as 
measured by the value of its foreign assets and 
the number of its employees abroad and is one 
of the largest cement companies in the world, 
with a presence in more than 50 countries. 
 
Yet Cemex has been skirting a liquidity—and 
some would say a solvency—crisis for the past 
three years. In August 2009, the company was 
fortunate to reach an agreement with 75 bank 
and private placement bondholders for the 
refinancing of $15 billion of debt. Almost half 
of that amount has since been paid down with 
the proceeds from asset sales, cost savings, 
and the placement of new bonds with coupons 
paying at least 9 percent. Cemex accounted for 
38 percent of all Mexican high-yield issuance in 
the U.S. dollar market during 2009; 17 percent 
of what Mexican companies raised in 2010; 
and a whopping 56 percent of new dollar bond 
issues so far this year—$2.45 billon. 
 
Given that Cemex’s performance is heavily 
dependent on the pace of construction 
activity—and the weak markets of Europe, 
Mexico, and the United States account for 
three quarters of its total sales—the company 
has not recorded a profit for eight quarters in a 
row, prompting its share price to plummet by 
nearly two-thirds since November 2009. As of 
end-September, Cemex remained out of 
compliance with a year-end, debt-to-EBITDA 
covenant ceiling under its financing agreement 
with (mostly bank) creditors. Continued 
weakness in the Mexican peso, which hurts the 
company because of its currency 
mismatches—97 percent of its debt is in 
currencies other than the Mexican peso—
means that Cemex may have to obtain a 
waiver or reset from its creditors. 
 
One would think that the precedent being set 
by Vitro would weigh more and more heavily 
on the minds of bond investors in Cemex and 
other risky Mexican corporations. After all, 
Cemex has a similar structure of debt at the 
holding level backed by guarantees from its 
foreign subsidiaries—and so do other Mexican 
companies. It may not be able to support a $20 
billion debt load,13 as implied by the 
company’s single-B rating as per Fitch and the 
recently downgraded assessment from 
Standard & Poor’s (B- with a Negative Outlook 
as of November 9). S&P’s downgrade reflected 
its realization that the company’s financial 
performance “will remain weak in the coming 
two years,” such that Cemex “will need to 
renegotiate the credit conditions of its 
financing agreement . . . and seek refinancing 
options for its late-2013 and 2014 debt 
maturities.”14 
                                                 
13
 Total debt adjusted for off-balance sheet obligations. 
See Fitch Ratings, “Cemex S.A.B. de C. V. Full Rating 
Report,” September 14, 2011, p. 22. 
14
 Standard & Poor’s Press Release, “Cemex 
Downgraded to ‘B-’ from ‘B’, Outlook Negative, Off 
Watch, on Concern for Performance in Depressed Key 
Markets,” November 9, 2011. 
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To see whether the Vitro precedent is starting 
to be internalized by credit analysts, investors, 
and rating agencies, last week this author 
contacted about a dozen of them and asked 
whether bondholders in particular are aware 
of the Vitro saga and are starting to hesitate to 
commit funds to other Mexican companies—
especially on an unsecured basis. 
 
The anecdotal evidence is mixed. Many 
investors are reportedly aware of the Vitro 
case, and some of them are asking more credit 
questions of sell-side and rating-agency 
analysts than before. The view often expressed 
is that Vitro may be a special case because of a 
uniquely investor-unfriendly attitude on the 
part of its management that will not be seen 
elsewhere. Others say that they expect Vitro’s 
restructuring plan to be thwarted by the courts 
on appeal, or even to lead to an eventual 
amendment in the Ley de Concursos 
Mercantiles—to clarify that the intent of the 
LCM is to handle the financial problems of any 
company on a consolidated basis, as per the 
law’s Article 4-II. In this vein, many investors 
are pleased to see that Vitro’s genuine 
creditors are willing to stand up for their rights 
and pursue litigation on both sides of the 
border.  
 
One fund manager quoted in a Bloomberg 
News story recently stated: “If I’m a CEO of a 
legitimate Mexican company, I’d be very mad 
right now at Vitro” because “Vitro’s use of 
intercompany debt may cause other Mexican 
companies to pay a ‘Vitro premium.’”15 
 
With regard to Cemex, specifically, many 
investors are said to perceive it as “too big to 
fail”—a company that the government would 
                                                 
15
 The quote is attributed to Robert Rauch, who manages 
$2.2 billion of emerging-market assets at Gramercy 
Advisors LLC. See Jonathan Roeder and Jonathan J. 
Levin, “JPMorgan Says Sell Defaulted Vitro Debt on 
Overvalued Offer,” Bloomberg News, November 8, 
2011. 
help out in case of emergency. Many also find 
comfort in knowing that because so many 
banks, bondholders, and jurisdictions are 
involved, Cemex may be “too complicated to 
fail.” Bondholders, who are said to feel more 
secure precisely because banks are deeply 
involved in Cemex, may have an incentive to 
refinance the company’s obligations and to 
keep it out of bankruptcy court—especially 
given the legal uncertainties generated by the 
Vitro precedent.  
 
As for any notable changes in the language of 
bond indentures, there is no evidence that the 
new issuance out of Mexico has included 
clauses that explicitly subordinate intra-
company claims—clauses of the type 
contained in the bonds that Vitro issued and is 
now attempting to void. Some point out that 
even the retailer Grupo Elektra and the 
broadcaster TV Azteca, both owned by 
billionaire Ricardo Salinas Pliego—a man with 
a checkered past who is reportedly viewed 
with suspicion by some investors16—were able 
to sell bonds earlier this year without 
apparently having to alter the usual boilerplate 
clauses to address intra-company debt. Only in 
one case—the refinancing of Iusacell debt this 
past June—did creditors insert language 
explicitly subordinating the mobile operator’s 
intra-company debts and banning the voting of 
any subsidiaries’ claims in the event of a future 
debt restructuring.17 
 
The point is also made that investor demand 
for high-yield issues out of Mexico and other 
                                                 
16
 The companies returned to the international bond 
market for the first time since Chairman Ricardo Salinas 
settled a fraud suit with the SEC in 2006. See Veronica 
Navarro Espinosa and Jonathan J. Levin, “Fraud 
Settlement Sapping TV Azteca Bond Demand,” 
Bloomberg News, May 19, 2011. 
17
 Grupo Iusacell Celular, S.A. de C.V., “9 percent 
Senior Secured Notes Due 2017 Indenture,” U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Exhibit T3C, July 
5, 2011, Section 3.5, “Intercompany Indebtedness,” p. 
38. 
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emerging markets, or even out of the United 
States for that matter, is largely determined 
not so much by company- or indenture-specific 
factors but rather by waves of investor 
optimism and risk appetite—especially these 
days, when “risk-free” rates are extraordinarily 
low. 
 
In sum, it may be too early to measure the 
broader market consequences of Vitro’s 
liability manipulations and of the questions 
raised by the handling of its concurso 
mercantil. Much probably depends on the final 
outcome of the litigation taking place in 
Mexico and the United States. In the 
meantime, as long as investors persuade 
themselves that one rotten apple does not 
contaminate the whole barrel, Mexican 
corporations may be able to retain the easy 
access to domestic and foreign financing that 
they have enjoyed during recent years. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Current financial-market perceptions 
notwithstanding, the fact is that Mexico is 
retrogressing, becoming an unpredictable and 
risky jurisdiction for the adjudication of 
legitimate claims involving domestic and 
international lenders and investors.  
 
This conclusion follows from an analysis of the 
precedent-setting corporate workout involving 
a major Mexican multinational (Vitro) now 
winding its way through the Mexican courts. It 
raises serious doubts about the capacity of 
that country’s insolvency regime to deliver an 
outcome viewed as fair and consistent with 
prevailing norms and practices in the United 
States and other reputable jurisdictions. The 
case may well have a chilling effect on the easy 
access to foreign financing that Mexican 
corporations have enjoyed during recent 
years. Cemex, Mexico’s flagship company, 
appears particularly vulnerable to adverse 
fallout from the Vitro case. 
There may be diplomatic ramifications as well. 
Two members of the U.S. Congress, 
presumably prompted by alarm bells rung by 
some of their constituents, have recently 
expressed concern to the Mexican authorities 
about the implications of the Vitro case. 
According to a news report, Representatives 
Patrick Meehan of Pennsylvania and Jared 
Polis of Colorado wrote to the Mexican 
ambassador to the United States, warning that 
Vitro’s bankruptcy strategy would “chill cross-
border investment” and should not be allowed 
to set a legal precedent: “Vitro’s unorthodox 
reorganization violated international 
bankruptcy norms by preserving equity for its 
own shareholders at the expense of its public 
creditors, many of whom are U.S.-based.”18  
 
Evidently, the Vitro case has the potential to 
complicate even U.S.-Mexico diplomatic 
relations. 
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 Heather Perlberg, “Vitro’s ‘Unorthodox’ Debt Plan 
Spurs U.S. Lawmakers’ Complaints,” Bloomberg News, 
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